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The "Just War" Theory: Application 
to United States and Israeli Militarism 
Daniel C. Maguire· 
THE HUMAN SPECIES HAS LONG BEEN ADDICfED TO WAR, FAVORING IT OVER GENTLER and more civilized modes of conflict resolution. In only eight percent of 
recorded history do we seem not to have been engaged in organized killing, 
and one wonders if, with further research, that eight percent gap might also reveal 
signs of bellicosity.' Humanity seems laced to the stubborn conviction that war can 
pass the most elementary ethical test of doing more good than harm. Efforts to apply 
the norms of justice to war have been halting, resisted, but not without some fruit. 
War is perhaps the most muddled zone in our human moralscape. When we talk 
about war, we wallow in misnomers. "Victory" is one of those. In truth you can no 
more win a war than you can win a hurricane. Both sides lose. One side loses less 
and spins that as victory. The term "war" itself is a misnomer and a euphemism. 
Long-tenured usage of the term and gilded myths of military glory have defanged 
and neutered the term. We now use it as a metaphor for the most humane activities, 
such as "the war on poverty," "the war on illiteracy," or the "war on cancer." We 
would not speak of raping poverty, illiteracy, or cancer because, rape, though all 
too common a crime, has not been linguistically purified. 
What came to be called "the just war theory" (JWT) was an early effort to put 
the brakes of justice claims on the destruction called war. Ancient wars aimed at 
obliteration. When the Romans cried "Carthago delenda est," they meant to leave 
nothing but dust and ash where Carthage once stood. And so they did, and this ac-
tion was defended by no less a sophisticated Roman than Marcus Tullius Cicero. 
This was the same lethal formula employed by the ancient Hebrews. Deuteronomy 
spells out the God-sanctioned manner of warring: "You shall put the inhabitants 
of that city to the sword; you shall lay the city under solemn ban together with 
everything in it. You shall gather all its goods into the square and burn both city and 
goods as a complete offering to the Lord your God; and it shall remain a mound 
of ruin, never to be rebuilt" (Deut. 13: 15-17). 
Restraints on the total obliteration approach appeared in ancient Greece. For 
practical and some humane reasons, they saw that Athens, Sparta, and Thebes 
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may fight, but that they were all Greeks, with a basically common language, and 
they would have to deal with each other after the hostilities. The Romans, brutal 
imperialists that they were, reached some comparable conclusions. They concluded 
that war should be authorized only by the state and that it had to be in some fashion 
formally declared and marked by some effort at good faith.2 
These faint beginnings would be developed later into what would be known as 
"the just war theory" in the Christian West when Christianity lost its early pacifism 
and needed to find a blessing for the newly friendly sword of Constantine.3 The 
"just war theory" has survived in various and often distorted forms into modern 
times, becoming today the most used and least understood part of the ethics of 
state-sponsored violence. President Barack Obama used and misused it in accepting 
the Nobel Peace Prize. Fragmented use of the theory is employed to justify every 
manner of military adventure. 
Applying the word "just" to war, which began with Aristotle, is part of the 
problem. To suggest that a war could be tout court "just" made it easier to overlook 
the atrocities that invariably accompany "the dogs of war." It shaded over the bru-
tal complexities and yielded to the tyranny of "military necessity," the term used 
to say that almost any means are justified to achieve "victory." Inter arma leges 
silent. In the heat of battle, the rules of morality are stilled and silenced. Indeed, 
making rules for war is rather like making rules for an orgy; neither activity is 
patient of regulation. 
Any Hope for "Just War" Theory? 
Properly understood, "just war theory" is a peacemaker's friend. The theory's 
redemptive power is that it puts resort to state-sponsored violence in the dock and 
on the defensive. Since its elements have been internationalized and woven into 
the efforts of international law and custom, the theory has a tenured position in 
international discourse and, for that reason, it needs to be understood and taken 
seriously. When it is properly presented, state-sponsored violence can never be 
justified, except in the "policing" paradigm enshrined in the Charter of the United 
Nations-a paradigm subsequently ignored or trivialized, especially by the two 
nations under scrutiny here, the United States and Israel. 
Taken seriously, the JWT would prove that all recent U.S. wars have been 
immoral and, therefore, nothing more, ethically speaking, than organized murder. 
The Israeli massacre of Gaza in December 2008, to cite but one example, failed 
every "just war" test. Indeed, that attack could not even be called a war, since Gaza 
has no army, navy, or air force. Moreover, the cornerstone of U.S. policy in the 
Middle East, i.e., our joined-at-the-hip alliance with Israel, fails the tests of justice 
on multiple counts if you seriously apply "just war" tests. 
The JWT had an honest birthing: it was born of the recognition that war is a 
horror and that any defense of it bears a huge burden of proof. It set up a series of 
six tests. For a war to be "just," it must pass not one or two, but all tests. Otherwise, 
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the "war" is a barbaric form of mass murder, however we dignify it with national 
liturgies and patriotic mythology. Since war-makers pull out parts of the JWT to 
hallow their wars, it serves peace well to remind them when their wars have failing 
moral grades. As ethicist Joseph Fahey says, "the 'just war' model was never meant 
to justify war. It was meant to limit war, to control war, and even to avoid war."4 
The allegedly "justified" war is usually the mask of an unconscionable failure to 
do the advance work of peace and to hide the total embarrassment of statecraft that 
state-sponsored violence tends to exemplify. 
The Six Criteria for a "Just War" 
I. A Just Cause 
Defense is the only "just cause." If war is waged to get oil, more territory, to 
wreak vengeance for perceived past offenses, or to preserve imperial hegemony, 
or if it is presented as a preemptive attack on possible future threats, it is not a just 
war and it has flunked the first test. For this reason, the Nuremberg trials treated 
preemptive war as a war crime. For this reason, with Hitler's preemptive war still 
a fresh memory, the United Nations Charter-to which the United States is bound 
by treaty-forbade preemptive wars and permitted state-sponsored violence (war) 
when nations react collectively within U.N. "policing" guidelines. The term "pre-
emptive war" is a mask for aggressive wars and vigilante wars.5 
As Richard Falk writes, "World War II ended with the historic understanding 
that recourse to war between states could no longer be treated as a matter of national 
discretion, but must be regulated to the extent possible through rules administered 
by international institutions. The basic legal framework was embodied in the 
U.N. Charter, a multilateral treaty largely crafted by American diplomats and legal 
advisers. [There's a bit of irony! [ Its essential feature was to entrust the Security 
Council with administering a prohibition of recourse to international force (Article 
2, Section 4) by states, except in circumstances of self-defense, which itself was 
restricted to responses to a prior 'armed attack' (Article 51) and only then until the 
Security Council had the chance to review the claim."6 
This meant that state-sponsored violence, like police violent action, may be 
necessary in extremis, but it should be in a communitarian context, hemmed in by 
legal restraint, with subsequent review and judgment. If this moral breakthrough 
were honored, if we moved from the vigilante mode of war to the policing para-
digm, it would be a major step toward a world without war. It is the way of human 
life, however, that moral ideals and moral breakthroughs like this appear as tender 
shoots and are easily crushed under the rushing wheels of expediency. 
2. Declaration by Competent Authority 
War can only be justified if it is waged to protect the common good. The gov-
ernment is by definition the prime caretaker of the common good. Corporations or 
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gangs cannot declare war, though in reality corporate manipulation of government 
is often decisive in the move to war. Our splendid Constitution saw this danger 
and said that it is the prerogative of Congress "to declare war" and to "provide for 
the common defense." President Truman led the trashing of this provision of the 
Constitution when he attacked Korea without a declaration of war. No president 
has honored it ever since. The copout now in vogue is for a supine Congress to pass 
a "Resolution" that hands over the war-making powers to the president, exactly 
what the Founders proscribed. 
The Congress-as-Patsy syndrome now in vogue is not the only culprit in this 
defection.A wimpy citizenry, beguiled by bread and circus,and seduced by govern-
mental propaganda, endorses and legitimates governmental criminal warring by its 
indifference and silence. As Anne Frank wrote, "I don't believe that only govern-
ments and capitalists are guilty of aggression. Oh no, the little man is just as keen 
on it, for otherwise the people of the world would have risen in revolt long ago."7 
The Constitution is not merely a collection of noble ideals. Rather, it is a practi-
cal plan for what works best in a democracy. When we frustrate the Constitution, 
failures ensue and democracy withers. According to Professor of International 
Relations Bruce Russett, democracies "more often win their wars-80 percent of 
the time." The reason is that "they are more prudent about what wars they get into, 
choosing wars that they are more likely to win and that will incur lower costs."8 Of 
course, we now enter wars the way autocracies and dictatorships do, with a cowardly 
press, a somnambulant citizenry, and a violated Constitution making that possible. 
The result? The United States now has a losing streak going, with four lost wars 
in a row. There is no way to describe the quagmire debacles of Korea, Vietnam, 
Iraq, and Afghanistan as victories. It is difficult to imagine what would constitute 
"victory" in any of these brutal misadventures. The Israeli "victory" in the 1967 
War, which tripled its size, was the gateway to current Middle East disasters,making 
Israel a truculent, beleaguered redoubt with more aggression as its only defense. 
This second "just war" criterion, declaration by the appropriate exercise of 
government, was meant to bring recta ratio-good and careful reasoning-to 
bear on the initiation of warring violence. In a democracy, it requires the informed 
consent of the people. The more participatory the decision-making process, the less 
likely it is that kill-power will be used foolishly. Tragically ,fear and propaganda 
regularly override reason as nations gird for battle. 
3. Right Intention 
This test may sound bland, but, like the others, it has a bite in it (indeed, many 
bites). This test focuses on why you go to war (jus ad bellum) and how you behave 
when you get there (jus in bello.) Truth has been called the first casualty in every 
war and the wounding of truth starts well before the war starts. There may be some 
hope in the fact that war-makers sense that truth is their enemy and the assault on 
truth accompanies the first steps to war. 
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At the outset, right intention means that the reasons alleged for the war should 
be the real reasons. When the war has begun, right intention works against manipu-
lative "support our troops" sloganeering by demanding to know why the troops 
were sent and how they are going about doing it. Simple as it may sound, there are 
many teeth in this requirement of justice. 
(a) Undue secrecy and propaganda violate "right intention." Secrecy in war, 
though allegedly for "national security," is often rooted in the war-makers' fear 
of the vox populi. (The enemy usually knows the secrets.) Secrecy is a tactic of 
propaganda and propaganda is intrinsically undemocratic and violent since it 
disempowers citizens. 
(b) Right intention means that you do not impose unrealistic conditions that 
stifle accommodation and peacemaking. "Unconditional surrender" was a demand 
that needlessly postponed the end of World War II. Similarly nonsensical are the 
claims that our wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan should go on "until we turn 
these nations into flourishing and edifying democracies." Recent history laughs 
at such specious defenses of our "shock and awe" approach to nation-building. 
Indeed, real democracy would run counter to our interest in oil-rich nations such as 
Saudi Arabia, since it would end our cozy deals with the autocrats who run them. 
Our uncritical support of Israel's military seizure and occupation of Palestinian 
properties and land is allegedly and ironically based on a shared love of democracy. 
However, as Israeli historian Shlomo Sand points out, by claiming to be "a Jewish 
state," Israel has defined itself not as a democracy, but an ethnocracy, since all non-
Jewish Israelis are there by sufferance and not as fully fledged citizens.9The idea of 
a "Jewish democratic state" is an oxymoron. A "Jewish democratic state" negates 
the e pluribus unum thrust of a modern democracy by downgrading the "many" in 
favor of a dominant ethnic and religious group. It is also an anachronism, harking 
back to ethnic tribalism and the clan, where unity was found in real or imagined 
biological linkage. The problem is confounded by the inability, even in Israel, to 
decide definitively who is "a Jew" and who is not. 10 The only hope for a peace-
ful Israel is in a single modem state in which the moral and spiritual strengths of 
Judaism can be celebrated in a welcoming pluralistic and truly democratic state. 
Ethnocracy purporting to be "democracy" cannot endure. 
(c) Right intention precludes the use of torture and other crimes against human-
ity. After Abu Ghrai band revelations of "water boarding," etc., American boasts of 
innocence were undone. Both the United States and Israel were founded on ethnic 
cleansing-of the Indians or Native Americans in the former, and the Palestinians 
in the latter. Ethnic cleansing means rendering an area ethnically homogenous by 
removing persons from another ethnic or religious group through force or intimi-
dation. An early American critic, Sylvester Judd, put it thus in 1842: "The people 
of this country would not be taxed without representation. They did not tax the 
Indians without representation, but exterminated them and planted themselves in 
their territories." 11 In one example, early America expropriated 25,000,000 acres 
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of Indian land to be sold to Europeans and Americans to pay for the Revolutionary 
War. Like Israel's euphemistic "settlements," this was land forcibly stolen from 
the indigenous peoples, a process that continues in Israel in ways that parallel the 
"reservations" and special status arrangements the United States used to isolate the 
Native Americans after the European invasion of North America. 
Israel's ethnic cleansing began in 1948. There are two narratives about what 
happened in Palestine then. Israeli historian Ilan Pappe states that for Israelis in 
1948, "two things happened, one of which contradicts the other." In one narrative, 
Zionism triumphed and Jews returned to their "promised land." However, this nar-
rative ignores "the ethnic cleansing carried out by the incoming Jews": in 1948, 
"500 Palestinian villages and 11 urban neighborhoods were destroyed; 700,000 
Palestinians were expelled from their homes, and several thousand more were 
massacred." 12 The Israelis refer to these events as a War of Independence. The 
Palestinians refer to 1948 as AI Nakba, the catastrophe. Right intention requires 
readiness to confess one's own crimes and make reparation. Otherwise, resentments 
endure and undermine peaceful solutions. 
Nations are prone to spin their own self-serving Aeneids regarding their ori-
gins. However, the United States and Israel cannot enter credibly or effectively 
into international converse of terrorism and ethnic cleansing if they pretend to 
innocence on these issues. Right intention requires candor and forbids righteous 
posturing and mendacity. 
(d) Right intention means that the burdens of war are distributed fairly. It means 
you do not field an army of the poor, apparent in the spirit of the wealthy father of 
James Mellon at the time of the Civil War: "A man may be a patriot without risk-
ing his own life or sacrificing his health. There are plenty of lives less valuable." 
Dick Cheney's five deferments during the Vietnam War illustrate the perdurance 
of this tradition. 
(e) Right intention means that if you cannot love your enemies, you will at least 
try to understand them. Why were the September 11 attackers so highly motivated? 
Why were their attacks directed against the United States and not Sweden or Brazil? 
Are there aspects of our Middle East policy or other policies that stirred this wrath? 
Why were 700,000 Palestinians forced from their home to make room for Israel 
resentful? Can their resentment simply be smothered by military might and occupa-
tion? These are fair questions. If they remain unasked and unanswered, intention 
is not right and any efforts at diplomacy are limited by the underlying deceptions. 
(f) Intention is not right if those closest to the action are denied the right to 
selective conscientious objection. Current policy in the United States requires 
military personnel to be absolute pacifists if they object to an ongoing war. They 
have no right to object to a particular war. This is a difficult case for soldiers to 
make if they have already joined the army. The idea of the soldier as automaton, 
with no more conscience than a fired bullet, is the keystone of military culture. 
Blind obedience is as immoral as slavery, and insisting on it pollutes the intention 
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of the war-makers. Soldiers forced to act against their own consciences suffer 
from what is called "moral wounds." This is an important factor in post-traumatic 
stress disorder. 13 
4. The Principle of Non-Combatant Immunity 
This condition makes a just modern war almost unimaginable and requires a 
return to the "policing paradigm" as presented in the United Nations Charter. "In 
the wars of the 1990s, civilian deaths constituted between 75 and 90 percent of 
all war deaths. Some two million children have died in dozens of wars during the 
past decade .... This is more than three times the number of battlefield deaths of 
American soldiers in all their wars since 1776."14 Military science has changed 
the nature of warfare. 
Terrorism is by definition the intentional killing of the innocent to make their 
governments do what you want. It violates the "just war" criterion. However, as 
the science of modem war developed, this kind of terrorism became standard op-
erating procedure, starting with World War II and continuing, with bald irony, in 
the "war on terror." Classical examples of terrorism are the atomic bombings of 
population centers in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The U.S. "Shock and Awe" tactic 
in invading Iraq, with its massive assault on civilians, is another example of ter-
rorism. State terrorism is infinitely more damaging than individual terrorism (such 
as the September 11 attacks) given the power differential. 
The overwhelming disproportion between Palestinian deaths and Israeli deaths 
in that conflict show the predominant lethality of state-sponsored violence. In 1987, 
with no effective supportcomingfrom the neighboring Arab nations, the Palestinians 
began what was called the intifada (a "waking up"). The disproportionate results 
show the power of state violence over small-group or individual violence. As Jimmy 
Carter observed, "seventy thousand Israeli troops were deployed to confront mostly 
young people throwing stones." Not one Israeli soldier was killed during the fist 
year of the intifada, with 12 Israeli fatalities occurring in the first four years of the 
uprising. In contrast, Israel acknowledged that over 700 Palestinian civilians were 
killed during that period. In the second intifada in 2000, 119 Israeli children were 
killed and 982 Palestinian children. 15 The Palestinians need lessons from Gandhi 
on the practicality and effectiveness of nonviolent power. 
Even before the modern scientific enhancement of kill-power, the idea of non-
combatant immunity was strained to the point of absurdity. In ancient India, laws 
were made in a futile effort to spare the "innocent." War was not to visit harm on 
"those who look on without taking part, those afflicted with grief, those who are 
asleep, thirsty, or fatigued or are walking along the road, or have a task on hand 
unfinished, or who are proficient in fine art." 16 The Talmud recognized a problem 
with sieges in which warriors and children are lumped together. It ruled that for 
a siege to be moral, it must not be four sided; one side must be left open for the 
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innocent to escape. Of course, a three-sided siege with an escape hatch is not a 
siege. Logic melts in the heat of "military necessity." 
The Principle of Double Effect 
In a cruel irony, one tool of "just war" theorizing is used to circumvent the 
requirement of noncombatant immunity. That tool is known as "the principle of 
double effect,"I7 and is widely used in distorted form, especially by war-makers. 
The core insight of the principle is straightforward: we often do good things that 
have bad effects. When is it moral to proceed in spite of that bad effect? That is the 
business ofthe principle of double effect. Thus, if we remove a cancerous uterus, the 
good effect is that the cancer is gone; the bad effect is that the woman is infertile. 
The question the double effect principle sought to answer is whether I am mor-
ally responsible for the bad effect. In gist, the answer is: "No, as long as you did not 
really want that bad effect, but merely reluctantly put up with it as an unavoidable 
consequence, and as long as there was proportionality between the effects." It has 
been described as the principle of moral and psychological disassociation. You may 
be justified if you do not will the bad effect, but merely reluctantly permit and put 
up with it. That is the psychological component. The moral justification rests on the 
judgment of proportionality, on whether the good envisioned outweighs the harm 
entailed. For instance, by ending a longstanding 90 to 100% white male monopoly 
in professions and jobs, affirmative action has the good effect of enfranchising 
women and other excluded groups and receiving the benefit of their previously 
suppressed talents. It has the bad effect of excluding, until the monopoly is broken, 
qualified white males. IS 
Both the psychological and the moral factors suffer when the principle of double 
effect goes to war. In the stress and chaos of war, the" good effect" (doing something 
to defeat the enemy) drowns out even the most horrific "bad effects," such as the 
deaths of one hundred thousand people in bombing raids on Tokyo or Dresden. 
Today, anything that might defeat "terrorism" is rationalized and "justified," in-
cluding U.S. "shock and awe" terrorism and Israel's allegedly defensive terrorism. 
Historical examples clarify the misuses and proper use of the principle of 
double effect. A siege always violates the principle of noncombatant immunity. 
More civilians died in the siege of Leningrad than in the infernos of Hamburg, 
Dresden, Tokyo, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki combined. Writing a few years after 
these atrocities, Henry Davis, S.J., in his Moral and Pastoral Theology, uses the 
principle of double effect to justify starving a population by siege. "Enemy troops 
may be starved by blockade. If civilians suffer, it is not intended that they should 
suffer; it is their misfortune, and it is due to the fortune of a just war that they hap-
pen to be in the same place as their army. Blockade and siege are in principle not 
different from the bombing of fortified garrison towns."I9 "It is their misfortune." 
Small comfort indeed! Note the chillingly strained effort to disassociate from the 
disaster: "it is not intended that they should suffer." As for proportion, their suf-
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fering is balanced by the demands of victory in a "just war." Here, justice claims 
are being made for what are clearly acts of terror. 
Ethicist Davis plunges more deeply into ethical absurdity when he justifies the 
bombing of hospital ships with the wounded on board. "The case may be imagined 
when even a hospital ship will be so valuable to the enemy for future aggression 
during a war that it may be of vital concern to sink it. Though such a necessity 
would be deplorable, we think the sinking of it may be justified, for what is at-
tacked is the ship; the deaths of those on board are incidental and not wished."20 
Writing four years after the bombings of Hiroshima on Nagasaki, Davis stated: 
"The morality of the use in war of the atomic bomb is not different from the mo-
rality of the use of any other explosive." Military necessity can trump ethics even 
in the hands of ethicists. To say that you may be exculpated for directly bombing 
people, including wounded people on a hospital ship, because you did not will it, 
but merely permitted it, is hair-splitting at its silliest. 
Another ethicist who examined World War II bombing practices showed that 
the same theory can be both perverted and helpfully used and applied. The Allies 
emulated Hitler in the practice of"obliteration bombing." Jesuit ethicist John Ford 
published "The Morality of Obliteration Bombing" in 1944, at the height of this 
practice. Against the strong militaristic headwinds of the time, he used the principle 
of double effect to argue that such bombing was immoral. It was impossible for 
bombardiers to drop bombs and withhold their intention to kill the people those 
bombs would directly strike. He also challenged the proportionality of this terrorist 
tactic. In the violent fervor of the moment, with victory as the all-justifying Holy 
Grail, no one heard Professor Ford. Following this line of thinking, however, the 
Second Vatican Council condemned the view that atomic weapons were simply 
another bomb. The use of atomic weapons merited, the bishops said, "unequivocal 
and unhesitating condemnation."21 
In sum, given the development of military science and the indiscriminate nature 
of modern weaponry,justice requires that human societies move to nonviolent modes 
of power and restrict state-sponsored violence to the policing paradigm envisioned 
in the Charter of the United Nations. If this paradigm is used, the principles and 
tests of just war theory can be profitably employed. 
5 and 6: Last Resort and the Principle of Proportionality 
The "last resort" principle is simple: resorting to violence when there are ne-
glected alternatives is barbaric. If state-sponsored violence is not our very last resort, 
we share the same moral ground with hoodlums who solve problems by murder. 
The principle of proportionality is the capstone of the JWT.lt means that the 
violence of war must do more good than harm. There is nothing wild about that 
statement. Anything we do, in any context, should do more good than harm. As 
weapons grow in lethality, wars are less and less able to pass this rudimentary test. 
Since the preparation for war bankrupts nations and starves the poor, wars start 
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their killing even before the first shot is fired. War has been called development 
in full reverse. It kills uninvolved people and animals and wreaks havoc on the 
environment, of which our economy is a wholly owned subsidiary. 
An honest, "strict constructionist" use of the just war theory challenges the 
conscience of war-makers. Warriors are champions at self-justification. It is an act 
of social justice to challenge them and show the rigid tests that must be passed 
before you use violence and ecological devastation to attain some proposed good. 
Without passing every JWTtest, the word "just" cannot be linked to the word "war." 
Philosophers and theologians have been remiss by failing to bring the demands of 
justice to the fore in the public square as nations embark on state-sponsored violence. 
Social Justice and the Just War Theory 
The literature on justice easily contains over 50 kinds. All of them are reducible 
to three. As I write in my book, Ethics: A Complete Method for Moral Choice: 
There are three forms of justice because persons relate to persons in three 
different ways. We relate on a one-to-one basis (commutative justice); 
individuals relate to the social whole (social justice); and the representa-
tives of the social whole relate back to individuals (distributive justice). 
When we talk about fulfilling contacts or repairing injuries done to the 
discrete individuals, we are speaking of commutative justice. When we 
speak of indebtedness to the social whole and the common good exempli-
fied by such things as taxes, voting,jury duty, and eminent domain, we are 
speaking of forms of social justice. And when we speak of distributing the 
goods and burdens of society fairly (largely but not exclusively through 
the instrumentality of government), we are speaking of distributive justice. 
Social and distributive justice both relate to the common good and are 
thus coordinates.22 
When a nation goes to war, social and distributive justice are key, but social 
justice is most crucial and fundamental. Social justice relates to what individual 
citizens, as individuals and as groups, owe to the common good. In a democracy, 
they are the demos to whom legitimate governments must respond.A mute, non par-
ticipatory demos abdicates its power and responsibility. War-making also involves 
the principal agent of distributive justice-the government, which alone has the 
power to declare war. However, government is grounded in the people. Even eight 
hundred years ago, Thomas Aquinas faced the view that distributive power is the 
sole prerogative of the "prince," the view insisted on by royal courts. Not at all, 
said Thomas. The prince gets the power from the people, the subjects (subditi in 
Thomas' wording). If the citizens are not, as Thomas says, contenti, satisfied, not 
making a fuss, they are underwriting and legitimating the deeds of government.23 
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Thus, citizenship is a moral vocation entailing duties of participation. If those 
duties of social justice are not fulfilled (and often large majorities of citizens do 
not even vote), then corporations, lobbies, and elitist interest groups will fill the 
democratic gap. Morally speaking, there is no time when citizens are more bound 
to rule by participation than when their government is killing people in their name. 
Because this duty is not fulfilled, true democracy remains a phantom in most cases 
and terms like corpocracy and lobbyocracy arise to cynically, but more accurately, 
describe the kind of government in place. 
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